


ADAPTATIONS TO THE "WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT"
APPROACH BY THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE



A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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ABSTRACT

ADAPTATIONS TO THE “WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT” APPROACH BY THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE by C. Dewayne Levo, 77 pages.

This study examines adaptations made by State, on adherence to directives requiring coordination with other USG departments and agencies, to effectively respond to current and future national security threats. Without the staff, tools, and training necessary to perform the required tasks, State is unable to fulfill wholly its role, as stipulated in Presidential Directives. Considering the global landscape, there is no way State can successfully perform some of the critical tasks stipulated in the Presidential Directives related to the “Whole of Government” approach, without extensively increased resources to fill capability gaps.

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To my parents, thanks for your time, care, and courage with ensuring my growth and development, as you transformed me into who I am today. Just as a relay team is strong as its weakest member, I appreciate your willingness to make yourselves vulnerable to the challenges of life, so that I could learn to reach back and receive the values and pride of your hand-off. Led by God, you molded my gifts and capacity, without ever seeking repayment. To you, I am ever grateful.

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ACRONYMS

AFRICOM	Africa Command
CRC	Civilian Response Corps
DoD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
FY	Fiscal Year
NSPD	National Security Presidential Directive
QDDR	Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
R&S	Reconstruction and Stabilization
S&T	Science and Technology
S/CRS	Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
U.S.	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
WOG	Whole of Government

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The United States has a significant stake in enhancing the capacity to assist in stabilizing and reconstructing countries or regions, especially those at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife, and to help them establish a sustainable path toward peaceful societies, democracies, and market economies. The United States should work with other countries and organizations to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law. Such work should aim to enable governments abroad to exercise sovereignty over their own territories and to prevent those territories from being used as a base of operations or safe haven for extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to U.S. foreign policy, security, or economic interests.

— George W. Bush,
National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44

World leaders face the most challenging situations ever. While creating opportunity and prosperity for many, globalization and technological advances provide the screen for the world to perform. The interconnectedness of today means every point of view is relevant, providing already over-burdened leaders less time to think about issues beyond their immediate priorities and responsibilities. The rate at which information travels the globe results in less time to plan and pressures from multiple stakeholders make it difficult to reach agreement. Swift action leading to long-term results is challenging.

In 1994, Robert D. Kaplan identified five factors he expected to be most prevalent, and would soon confront our civilization in his article titled “The Coming Anarchy”:

1. Population
2. Resource Scarcity

3. The negative effects of disease

4. The challenge of governance

5. The nature and mode of conflict

According to Kaplan, “West Africa is becoming the symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental, and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real strategic danger” (Kaplan 1994, 2). Today, the world is plagued with each of the challenges identified by Kaplan. Escalating populations has led to restrictions on the number of births in nations. Natural resources such as water, a source of life, are unavailable to millions of people. Incurable disease has ravaged some nations, resulting in societies teeming with youth. Along with those challenges, we face migrations from tribal regions into urban areas and ultimately to new countries. These types of societal stresses result in erosion of nations exploited by unwelcome factions. Each of these five factors represents a chance to work toward mitigating its effects as well as a threat to the security of the United States (U.S.). They require a transformation in the way we connect with American citizens as well as other populations.

Over the next two decades, the majority of the world’s population growth will occur in developing nations, those least capable of supporting it politically, environmentally, or economically. An overwhelming majority of population growth is expected to transpire throughout Africa and South Asia (United Nations General Assembly resolutions 59/209, 59/210 and 60/33 2007). Those areas are most prevalent on The Fund for Peace failed state index. While some nations are trying to mitigate unsustainable growth, others are reluctant to react.

Agricultural advances such as improved machinery, irrigation techniques, and the process of genetic modification resulted in significantly increased crop yields during the later part of the 20th century. On the other hand, overuse of fertilizers and pesticides results in pollution and desertification, followed by declining crop yields.

Undernourished people around the world total a staggering 1.02 billion. There is no reason for this when globally food production yields more than enough to feed everyone. The problem stems from poverty as many individuals do not have the means to purchase land, grow food, or purchase food outright. Natural disasters and climate changes also result in loss of crops, leading to sharp rises in the cost of food (World Hunger Facts 2009).

The rapid depletion of natural resources is a global concern, creating more interconnectedness among nations. Every nation needs something another nation has. Some nations lack the majority of the things they need. Even access to water is a challenge today. Lack of clean water, leading to sickness and premature death, is the reality millions face annually. Global reliance on oil is tantamount, increasing the need for nations to negotiate trade agreements. Unstable oil prices and supply interruptions tend to increase tension between nations. Energy demand is projected to increase forty-five percent by 2030, possibly leading to feuding (International Energy Agency 2008, 4).

Tens of millions worldwide have succumbed to the ravages of Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, among them, an unfathomable number of orphaned children. Africa is ground zero for the pandemic. Two-thirds of all people with Human Immunodeficiency Virus/ Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome live in Africa. As many as fourteen million children have suffered

the loss of at least one of their parents. Swarming youth populations can be dangerous. The instability of nations in the developing world are more susceptible to terrorism and violence, provided such a young population. Knowledge of the disparity between the wealthy and the poor, as a result of globalism, tends to spur a greater number of radicals seeking an improved quality of life.

In addition, populations are migrating in higher numbers to urban centers in pursuit of higher paying jobs and better access to services. This urbanization presents real opportunity for rural workers to modernize their skills and improve their lives. But there can be drawbacks. If a government is unable to support this growth, rampant urban poverty can result. And while some seek urban exile in their country of origin, others leave that country altogether (Global Strategy Institute 2010).

Globalization has transformed governance into a new era. The system of government exclusive of external actors has been replaced with a world in which true power exists beyond the hands of traditional governments. Our leaders will be challenged like never before as they search for solutions to a multitude of problems. In order to address future challenges, creative cooperation among everyone from the private sector to international governments and institutions will be necessary. The topography of power has changed. Neither national nor international governments have the power or influence they once enjoyed. Sweeping changes have exposed the vulnerability of nation states and their challenge to reformulate their roles and responsibilities.

Patterns of conflict have changed greatly since the Cold War. Non-state operatives increasingly conduct "asymmetric" warfare. These atypical adversaries - non-state ideologues, transnational criminal syndicates, and rogue states - employ

unconventional tactics against traditional military powers, like the U.S. Unconventional tactics include use of targets which are not well defined, capitulation, and hidden support for one side of a conflict. “Conflict is more likely to occur between warring groups of individuals on residential streets than between national armies on battlefields. We now face insurgents who mix with the local populace and shelter themselves in safe havens of nation states that are unable or unwilling to root them out and eradicate their ideologies” (Global Strategy Institute 2010).

Ultimately, this has led to instances such as the Iraq and Afghanistan occupations where the military is now required to engage in the “three block war.” On one block, U.S. troops are fighting terrorists while on the next block they may be engaged in peacekeeping efforts, and on the third block some form of humanitarian assistance ensues. While this effort may be absolutely necessary, military engagement in nation building and/or peacekeeping is not customary. Traditionally, those efforts are led by other agencies such as the Department of State (DOS) or the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The experts who normally perform the tasks that our uniformed military members are engaged in today could argue that the U.S. war efforts have suffered due to the lack of experience and knowledge in performing such tasks.

While some may view Kaplan as a pessimist, he appears to have been accurate in his depiction of what the state of the world would look like in the years ahead. Present day analysis of the issues highlighted by Kaplan indicates that the national security of the U.S. may be in jeopardy. Horst Rittel, who introduced “wicked problems” as ill-

structured and unsolvable using traditional strategies, further stresses the extent of social complexity today (Conklin 2006, 5).

Recognizing the need to change the United States Government's (USG) approach to dealing with issues impacting our national security, the last three Presidential Administration's released Presidential Directives stipulating that U.S. departments and agencies work together to best thwart threats against the nation. Operating in a synchronized manner employing all elements of national power is essential to accomplish this task. State was put in the lead to coordinate this effort. Thirteen years since the initial directive, this research will explore State's adaptation.

Research Question

The focus of this thesis is to identify how the U.S. DOS has adapted to the "Whole of Government" (WOG) approach, aligning with the U.S. military and sister agencies. According to U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07 the WOG approach is an approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.

Significance of the Study

In an attempt to advance freedom for the benefit of the American people and the international community, State must work with other USG departments and agencies at all levels. The degree of coordination significantly effects success countering threats against national security. Not only are the issues Kaplan spoke of prevalent, they are substantially more difficult to solve as they are now transforming into wicked problems, unique and possibly without a solution. The challenges of today require not only critical

thinking by extremely intelligent individuals, but also the application of smart power. Significantly complex issues, coupled with unpredictable effects of globalism and interconnectivity, may limit opportunities for resolution. Historically, the U.S. failed in responding to global issues, but moving forward, success must prevail.

Assumptions

In order to facilitate research, the author made assumptions about this subject. First, the DOS lacks the personnel and resources necessary to conduct Reconstruction and Stabilization (R&S) tasks, in highly unpredictable and unsecure areas. Secondly, the civilian capacity of USG departments and agencies is insufficient to succeed at R&S operations in highly volatile areas without essential protection being provided by the U.S. military. The author realizes there is a difference between stability operations, R&S, and peace building, but for purposes of this study those terms are used interchangeably.

Limitations

State engages in decentralized management. As such, there is no concentration of information available within one office on topics covered in this research. Consequently, identifying advances made by the Department on the WOG approach is very challenging. In the absence of a centralized information source, it is expected that gaps exist in facts pertaining to State's adaptations. Finally, this thesis will establish a research cutoff date of 9 April 2010, in order to facilitate timely analysis of information.

Delimitations

The research makes use of unclassified and public sources of information. The completed thesis is also unclassified with unlimited distribution.

Summary

Chapter 1 identified threats to U.S. national security as prophesized by Kaplan, and their relevance today. Next, parameters of the WOG approach to effectively counter those threats were introduced. Additionally, the significance of this study, specified assumptions, limitations, and delimitations were presented. Chapter 2 surveys both published and non-published literature on State initiatives, the WOG approach, and information relevant to the study. Chapter 3 explains the methodology used to analyze the secondary research questions, which aids in answering the primary research question. Chapter 4 is the analysis of the secondary research questions, using the methodology outlined in chapter 3, facilitating a response to the primary research question. Finally, chapter 5 summarizes key points from chapter 4, states the conclusion, and proposes recommendations for future research.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Literature used to give form to this thesis varied significantly from Presidential Directives to periodicals and previous studies on how State has adapted to the WOG approach. Information, facts, and figures date back to the late 1990s during the Clinton Administration. Initial sources dealt with the general orders issued by Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama describing how the USG would respond to potential threats against the nation. From those sources the author turned toward information to support Kaplan's thesis that overpopulation, environmental exploitation, erosion of institutions, unnatural borders and breakdown of civil order is pushing the world toward a state of anarchy. Finally, after reviewing information pertaining to the subjects identified above, it was necessary to assess the ability of State to perform specified tasks outlined in the WOG approach. From that assessment, a clear understanding of the overall capabilities of State emerged, outlining adaptations to the WOG approach. The remainder of this chapter highlights key points within these sources and evaluates the quality of the information available.

Presidential Directives

Presidential Decision Directive/National Security Council 56

The Clinton Administration released the Presidential Decision Directive/National Security Council 56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations* in May 1997. The intent of this directive was to incorporate lessons learned into the interagency process on a regular basis and establish management practices to achieve unity of effort among USG

agencies and international organizations. The following practices are mentioned within that directive:

identify appropriate missions and tasks, if any, for U.S. Government agencies in a U.S. Government response;

Develop strategies for early resolution of crises, thereby minimizing the loss of life and establishing the basis for reconciliation and reconstruction;

Accelerate planning and implementation of the civilian aspects of the operation;

Intensify action on critical funding and personnel requirements early on;

Integrate all components of a U.S. response (civilian, military, police, etc.) at the policy level and facilitate the creation of coordination mechanisms at the operational level; and

Rapidly identify issues for senior policy makers and ensure expeditious implementation of decisions. (Presidential Decision Directive 1997)

National Security Presidential Directive 44

Overarching interagency policy direction for R&S is set forth in the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44. Disseminated in December 2005, its purpose is to: "Promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife" (Bush 2005).

Assigning responsibility to State to coordinate and lead integrated efforts with Department of Defense (DoD), and other USG agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct R&S operations is a key point in this directive. NSPD 44 laid out the following tasks for the Secretary of State with assistance from the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS):

1. Develop strategies for R&S activities; provide U.S. decision makers with detailed options for R&S operations; ensure program and policy coordination among U.S. departments and agencies; lead coordination of R&S activities and preventative strategies

with bilateral partners, international and regional organizations, and nongovernmental and private sector entities.

2. Coordinate interagency processes to identify states at risk of instability, lead interagency planning to prevent or mitigate conflict, develop detailed contingency plans for integrated U.S. R&S, and provide U.S. decision makers with detailed options for an integrated U.S. response.

3. Lead U.S. development of a strong civilian response capability; analyze, formulate and recommend authorities, mechanisms and resources for civilian responses in coordination with key interagency implementers such as aid; coordinate R&S budgets among departments and agencies; identify lessons learned and integrate them into operational planning by responsible agencies.

Presidential Policy Directive 1

Most recently, on 13 February 2009, the Obama Administration released Presidential Policy Directive 1, *Organization of the National Security Council System* followed by Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05, which highlights the Obama Administration's embrace of integrating all elements of national power in a cohesive manner. Each of the Presidential Directives detailed above support and calls for an integrated USG response to national security issues. These are the foundational documents supporting the WOG principles departments and agencies strive to meet.

Social Sources

According to Kaplan, overpopulation, environmental exploitation, erosion of institutions, unnatural borders, and breakdown of civil order is pushing the world toward

a state of anarchy. In support of his theory, several sources were available discussing the effects of population growth, resource scarcity, negative effects of disease, challenge of governance, and the nature of conflict. Starting with the Global Strategy Institute, the researcher was able to find a host of sources to support Kaplan's theory. Information on world hunger, energy demands, population trends, disease, governance, and conflict is readily available. To validate the vast amount of information provided through several sources, the researcher cross-referenced the information among other sources to assess its validity. When the data appeared to reach consensus, then and only then was it added to this study.

Periodicals and Previous Studies

Several studies were completed on the WOG approach and USG department and agency response to threats against the nation. However, it is important to be able to trace the information provided by the authors. A great source of some of the latest thoughts on this topic can be found in the journal published through the Center for Complex Operations *Prism*. This journal in addition to many others clearly lays out the sources and makes it easy to find information to support the thesis and conclusions of the articles found within.

When researching a topic such as the WOG approach, it is best to start with the laws or directives that it stems from. Then, studying the information objectively and mitigating as best as possible personal bias, allows one to fully develop a paper with depth and substance. The information in the periodicals appears to do just that.

Chapter Conclusion

The evaluation of the information in chapter 2 has created a solid pool of resources, facts, and news that serves as the foundation for this thesis. Included in that pool are Presidential Directives outlining the WOG approach, current data in support of Kaplan's theory, and evaluations and ideas surrounding the civilian capacity of State to live up to its role. The next chapter evaluates the primary methods of performing research and identifying the method selected to complete this research.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Two primary methods of research are quantitative and qualitative. The quantitative approach involves an investigation of the human or social problem based on testing a theory composed of variables, measured by numbers, and analyzed with statistical procedures to determine whether the predictions of the theory are substantiated. Qualitative research has to do with the comprehension of a human or social problem based on detailed, first-hand experiences in a natural environment (Cresswell 1994). Qualitative researchers conduct studies in natural settings in an effort to interpret phenomena based on human experience and influence. More often than not, researchers adjust the variables in qualitative research studies to acquire results and reach interpretations which can be generalized. Qualitative researchers conduct studies in natural settings without manipulation. They primarily focus on understanding how people make sense of their life experiences. The researcher's goal is to understand, discover, and interpret the association of words, actions, and records of the people in the study (Denzen and Lincoln 1994).

There are strengths and weaknesses to both research approaches. One advantage of the quantitative approach is that this approach makes it possible to measure the reactions of a large number of people to a limited set of questions. This allows comparison and statistical aggregation of the findings. This enables the quantitative approach to provide a strong basis for generalization of the results. By the same token, qualitative methods usually produce valuable, detailed information about a much smaller number of people. The end result is the qualitative approach increases understanding of

the cases but reduces generalizations (Patton 1994, 14). An advantage of the qualitative approach allows the researcher to obtain a more realistic feel of the natural world, which the numerical data and statistical analysis can not explain, more flexibility of the data collected, and a more complete picture of the subjects under investigation. A major weakness of qualitative research studies is the susceptibility of the researcher's personal bias on the final interpretation of the research. As a result, qualitative research could be without objectivity if no quality control methods are applied (Bogdan and Biklen 1982).

The researcher is currently employed by State. As such, a slanting of the information is possible. However, to overcome that bias, the researcher tried to rid himself of all partiality or prejudice when gathering information and drawing conclusions by integrating sources outside of State where possible. The goal of the researcher is analysis without a significant amount of bias.

As a participant observer, the researcher takes time to understand the cultural setting of the subjects. The core of this method is the interaction between the researcher and the subject as he or she adopts an active role in the study while observing and recording the patterns of behavior. Researchers who apply this method conduct direct observations by observing and collecting data on the activities of the subjects in their natural environment without their knowledge. There is a formal approach to collecting data through interviews. It is the researcher's choice to administer structured or unstructured interview questions. Studies are also conducted by using audio and visual materials, books, news clips, organizational records, maps, charts, and journals of actual events.

For the purpose of this study, various documents were analyzed. Transcripts from live interviews conducted by others were reviewed, and interviews were conducted by the researcher. The interview population considered were individuals currently encumbering positions within State related to the topic covered in this research. Unfortunately, DoS Foreign Service Officers hold positions for limited periods of time before transferring to new areas. As such, the historical accounts by employees who have moved on sometimes provide more depth and insight than their successors. However, the researcher was able to find employees who were able to provide thorough historical perspectives in areas that were difficult to analyze in the absence of outside perspectives. Seeking out such individuals helped to establish quality control in addition to the following four tests:

1. Construct validity by establishing the correct operational measures for the concepts in the study.
2. Internal validity by establishing whether the evidence of the study supported the existence of a causal relationship.
3. External validity, this involves establishing the sphere to which a study's conclusions could be generalized beyond the immediate study.
4. Reliability of the test which involves establishing consistency of the operations of the study (Kidder 1981, 7-8).

Having considered both methods, the author chose the qualitative approach because of its convenience and because there is little information written on the research question.

Data Collection

Various data collection methods may be employed in qualitative research studies. Some popular methods include participant observation in the setting under investigation, direct observation, in-depth interviews, and analyzing documents and material culture. Because of time constraints, this method was considered suitable (Marshall and Rossman 2006). In addition, the Combined Arms Research Library at Fort Leavenworth, KS provided literature for the study.

Thus, success of this project relied on analyzing assorted documents published on reconstruction, stabilization, S/CRS, State, and the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). Credible websites assisted in filling gaps that existed in some published material. State websites helped to access information on the organization's activities that were unattainable in printed form. Former speeches conducted by State officials were also beneficial to this study. The author was unable to access *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR)* printed reports from any libraries due to rigorous protocols. Nevertheless, the convenience of websites provided much of the needed data with much more ease. Legitimate online newspapers provided news clips and correspondents were valuable sources of live interviews with State and U.S. military officials.

Additionally, through live interviews conducted with interviewees from State, the researcher sought answers to secondary questions, which assisted in answering the primary question of this thesis. Questions were designed to try and find information about actions taken or not taken on the part of State, which would provide insight into its

adaptations to the WOG approach. Prior to using the information gathered, interviewees provided informed consent to employ the material in this research.

The author considered the shortcomings of depending too much on documents. He was aware that information in some of the documents was not relevant to this study. Because of the examination of many articles from a variety of sources, intelligent lines of information came together. Precise reference of sources allows other researchers to authenticate the validity of the study and arrive at the same conclusions.

Analysis

The final phase involved separating, organizing, exploring, scrutinizing, and classifying patterns, relationships, and definitions from the pertinent resources associated with State's adaptation to the WOG approach to facilitate answers to subsequent research questions. The central focus of the analysis was on State's adaptation to the WOG approach. It was broken up into sections according to the various questions, referencing the information analyzed in chapter 2 as the criteria for interpretation.

Summary

This chapter described, confirmed, and defended the use of the qualitative method of research in this study. Specifically, the author explained the advantages and disadvantages of both the quantitative and qualitative methods and acknowledged why the qualitative approach was chosen. In doing so, he also presented strong reasoning for choosing this method, the data collection techniques, as well as the analysis process utilized in addressing follow-up questions brought about in the study. The following chapter will expound on the analysis and presentation of the data.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Coordinator for Reconstruction & Stabilization

Innovative change is necessary for the security of the nation. With unflinching resolve and determination, Americans endured monumental challenges during the 20th century. Two world wars, civil unrest, and economic setbacks are just a few examples. The tenets of the Constitution of the U.S. and the Bill of Rights are the cornerstone of the enduring resiliency of the people to overcome such obstacles. Advancing freedom, values, and equality for all resulted in a more secure, democratic, and prosperous world. Unfortunately, today that condition is challenged more and more.

The mission of the U.S. DOS is “to advance freedom for the benefit of the American people and the international community by helping to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world composed of well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty, and act responsibly within the international system.”

The U.S. as well as the rest of the world faces long-term security problems. Weak and failed states produce prolific security threats such as terrorism, drugs and arms, refugee flows, weapons of mass destruction, trafficking in people, and piracy which can harm us from afar. These problems will endure indefinitely into the future, and capacity must be built to tackle them. According to the Fund for Peace Failed States Index 2009, there are 38 failed or failing states. Adequately addressing the threats emanating from weak and failing states and ungoverned spaces is necessary to protecting U.S. national security interests.

American leaders realize that strengthening U.S. diplomatic power is required to effectively deal with challenges confronting the nation. In July 2004, Congress authorized the reprogramming of funds to create S/CRS. Subsequent to that, President Bush issued NSPD 44, which stipulated that the Secretary of State with assistance from S/CRS “shall coordinate and lead integrated USG efforts, involving all U.S. departments and agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.” Unfortunately, the funding necessary to hire, train and develop staff to perform those tasks was not provided.

Four years later, in 2008, Congress passed and the President signed, the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008 (Title XVI of Public Law 110-417). Through this act, in fiscal year (FY) 2008, supplemental funding for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative was provided in the amount of \$65 million. FY 2009 provided an additional \$75 million in funding (\$45 million for S/CRS and \$30 million for USAID), while FY 2010 appropriations made available \$150 million to S/CRS out of the \$323.3 million requested in the President’s FY 2010 budget request.

As of 9 April 2010, S/CRS staffing totals 920 interagency employees, inclusive of 100 active members of the Civilian Response Corps (CRC), and 670 standby members. The CRC is made up of representatives from agencies throughout the USG, allowing them to build upon and draw on existing skills and expertise, and more easily reach back to interagency partners. Presently, it is comprised of representatives from seven Federal Departments and an Agency (State, Health and Human Services, Commerce, Agriculture, Justice, Treasury, Homeland Security, and the USAID). FY 2010 funding provides for

hiring, training, and equipping a CRC of 4,250 members. The goal of S/CRS is to recruit a total of 250 active, 2000 standby, and 2000 reserve members.

The mission of S/CRS is “to lead, coordinate and institutionalize USG civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy” (State.gov 2010). The approach of S/CRS to the problem of failed and failing states is best described in three phases: civilian surge, comprehensive planning, and full coordination. Through the CRC, S/CRS purports the ability to provide WOG expertise, trained planners, rapid deployments, funded expeditionary corps, and civil-military coordinators.

R&S requires extensive planning. Unfortunately, many USG civilian departments and agencies do not have a large pool of resident planning experts to make use of. Recognizing the deficiency, S/CRS has partnered with the U.S. military to provide extensive training for its members in planning. Exercises and experiments with interagency, military, and multinational partners provide Corps members with hands-on, practical experience. Geographic combatant commands such as U.S. AFRICOM, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Southern Command have integrated civilian planners with military stability operations planning teams. Participating in and hosting international training programs and exercises, convening workshops, dialogues, and meetings to deepen collaboration, and coordinating collective deployments and assessments to the field further strengthens the planning capabilities of Corps members.

Strengthening coordination, S/CRS participates in the International Stabilization and Peace-building Initiatives. The International Stabilization and Peace-building

Initiative is a network of governments and international organizations committed to joint civilian missions. Currently, 14 governments and 5 international organizations are members. The International Stabilization and Peace-building Initiative is committed to improving the effectiveness of stabilization, and peace-building operations by enhancing civilian capacity globally and strengthening interoperability among international actors.

Moreover, the integrated Interagency Management System enhances unity of effort across the government and with partners at all levels of planning and implementation. The Interagency Management System integrates planning processes for unified USG strategic and implementation plans, including funding requests, coordinates joint interagency field deployments, and manages a joint civilian operations capability, incorporating shared communications and information management procedures. Utilizing members of the CRC, S/CRS is capable of supporting and augmenting existing structures at all levels (Washington, Combatant Commands, and in the field).

To build local capacity for self governance, S/CRS identifies R&S strategies on the ground in recipient nations. S/CRS then acts on informed policy decisions to mitigate conflict. Also, the Coordinator can systematize the USG's conflict prevention and response to replace the current ad hoc method of responding to crises, in addition to international coordination to ensure unity of effort by all concerned parties. This is so, because CRC planners are able to rapidly deploy, provide stabilization strategies, and deploy experts to complete necessary actions. S/CRS has the ability to tap into all USG state and local agencies, the private sector, contractors, and others to provide expertise in the range of processes necessary in a transition from crisis including: policing and rule of law, infrastructure development, economic stabilization, state and local governance,

agriculture, and provision of basic services. Tapping into all categories of workers further expands the pool of deployable civilian experts as well.

Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act authorized the Secretary of Defense to transfer to the Secretary of State up to \$100 million annually to provide assistance in reconstruction, security, and stabilization. The Secretary of State delegated responsibility for implementation of the “1207” program to S/CRS. Section 1207 funding provides over \$450 million in projects covering 28 countries over 5 years. 1207 funding increases value because it reflects an interagency perspective, leverages host government and local contributions, and fills gaps not met by other foreign assistance programs.

While there may be vision and direction within the organization, to date, guiding doctrine outlining principles or tenets of S/CRS do not exist. Attempts made to develop guidelines on operations, were not completed. Currently, the global portfolio of 1207 funding contains \$450 million to support R&S projects in 28 countries worldwide. Surely, there have been hurdles to overcome with those projects. If R&S was such a simple task, there would not be a need for S/CRS. Utilizing lessons learned as well as best practices from previous R&S projects, both within and external to S/CRS, would be a great start to developing doctrine.

The Clinton Administration released Presidential Decision Directive 56 in May 1997. That directive stipulated that “while agencies of government have developed independent capacities to respond to complex emergencies, military and civilian agencies should operate in a synchronized manner through effective interagency management and the use of special mechanisms to coordinate agency efforts.” Subsequent to issuance of Presidential Decision Directive 56, the Bush Administration issued NSPD 44 stating that

“The Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated USG efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.“ Most recently, on February 13, 2009, the Obama Administration released Presidential Policy Directive 1, followed by Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05, which highlights the Obama Administration’s embrace of integrating all elements of national power in a cohesive manner. Presidential Policy Directive 1, Presidential Decision Directive 56, and NSPD 44, direct USG departments and agencies to institutionalize lessons learned.

While the State Department, United Nations and other organizations have identified states at risk of instability, S/CRS has not made the most of that information. Implementation plans have been produced for a limited number of failed states, but there are no contingency plans in place to deal with issues of instability in failing or unstable countries. S/CRS has a small unit that looks at the classified and unclassified listings of failed states and other lists related to countries of concern. That information feeds into S/CRS deliberations with regard to countries, which are being considered for 1207 funding. Those are also the countries that are generally scheduled for planning and conflict assessment sessions.

The perception is that S/CRS is not fully prepared to deal with situations of instability around the world. S/CRS should try and prepare for a multitude of possible scenarios. Staffing levels may be the reason for failure to complete contingency planning. Approximately 100 of the 250 Active Component positions are filled. Furthermore, approximately 60 of the 100 Active Component employees have completed training requirements of S/CRS. NSPD 44 stipulates that State “develop detailed contingency

plans for integrated USG R&S efforts for those states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife and for widely applicable scenarios, which are integrated with military contingency plans, where appropriate.”

Several factors account for why S/CRS is understaffed. With competing demands to fill positions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, several offices within the Department are understaffed. Unlike the military, which is composed of 2.7 million active and reserve members, State has less than 15,000 members. Additionally, S/CRS is not widely recognized within the Department, and lacks the appeal necessary to garner promotions for one’s service. While it is true many of the employees of S/CRS deploy to the most challenging, hardship locations 50 to 60 percent of the year, for periods of up to 90 days at a time, their service is not viewed as deserving of a promotion. Taking advantage of retirees, many of whom are quite young, proves challenging as dual compensation waivers are only approved for retirees serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. Basic compensation paid to a reemployed annuitant who retired under the Civil Service Retirement System or Federal Employees Retirement System will be offset by the amount of the annuity received through retirement or risk having their annuity terminated according to the Dual Compensation Act of 1964. While S/CRS is progressing with hiring, it will take time before the realization of adequate staffing.

In addition to reach back and the ability to ensure resources and expertise when necessary, it seems S/CRS could benefit from better coordination within State. The Office of Strategic and Performance Planning, which develops the Department’s Strategic Plan as well as facilitates completion of the Mission and Bureau Strategic Plans, may be able to provide excellent insights into issues prevalent around the world.

Engaging with staff from the Office of Strategic and Performance Planning could advance completing contingency plans. The latest Mission Strategic Plan for Bangladesh was recognized as the best plan throughout the State Dept. submitted in 2010. Planners from S/CRS assessed the issues, evaluated the context, gaining a clear understanding of the core grievances and sources of resilience, identified drivers of conflict and mitigating factors, and provided opportunities for increasing or decreasing conflict. This culminated into a well developed depiction of the issues and the necessary actions to correct them. S/CRS should engage Departmental offices for the sake of efficiency. According to an Office of Inspector General report completed on S/CRS,

whatever the language of the Secretary's broad mandate, S/CRS has found little traction within the Department, and with other key interagency players, in its efforts to play a lead role in reconstruction and stabilization of nations in crisis. Usually, it finds itself on the sidelines or marginally involved, in part because the other players have not seen what value or resources S/CRS could add. (Office of Inspector General 2007, 4)

S/CRS hasn't reached its full potential. The unfortunate earthquake in Haiti provided a glimmer of a chance, but it was not realized. S/CRS sought approval to take the lead following the devastating earthquake in Haiti, early in 2010, but it is not in line with their mandate. S/CRS was established to lead and coordinate USG efforts following conflict or civil strife situations. Natural disasters do not fall into that category. USAID typically takes the lead in USG humanitarian assistance efforts abroad.

In the wake of the quake, S/CRS was prepared to send approximately 50-60 employees and volunteers, but that effort was thwarted. USAID had gone more than a year without a leader. President Obama selected Rajiv Shah to be the new Administrator of USAID just one week before the quake struck, and decided that Shah should coordinate the U.S. humanitarian efforts.

Even though S/CRS was not in the lead, they did participate in the USG effort by imbedding an employee in Southern Command to assist with visa adjudications. Analyzing previously prepared plans for Haiti, S/CRS along with an interagency group including USAID, Commerce, and Justice, morphed those previously prepared plans into updated planning and policy documents prepared on various sectors to be used in the future. Leaders within State are making use of those documents today.

USAID could find S/CRS assistance beneficial. The researcher feels that USAID is good at some things, but not coordinating. Employees of USAID tend to be very insular on planning. This may be due to a lack of planning skills on a level commiserate with that of the members of the U.S. military. As noted earlier, several of the civilian departments and agencies lack highly skilled planners.

Organizational building is an arduous process, ripe with obstacles, which typically requires large amounts of time. More often than not, when building an organization, there is no shortage of opportunities to turn obstacles into opportunities. As such, S/CRS has made some significant accomplishments. Among them are:

1. Creating a scalable force whose internal staff has grown to 150 and an active CRC composed of 100 members. This allows S/CRS to better meet the challenge of leading and coordinating the USG civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations and help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife.

2. Initiation of R&S projects in 28 countries worldwide as well as support to several embassies and their USAID missions in their design of an integrated approach to addressing causes of instability.

3. S/CRS has a Civilian Standby Component of 670 members towards its goal of 2000.

4. It has dispatched 281 representatives to several places around the world including Sudan, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Bangladesh.

Prior to Iraq, civilians were last recruited and deployed to a combat zone in support of U.S. pacification programs during the Vietnam War. The Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support was a huge success. However, we must remember that the interagency participants were integrated with military participants. Of the 7,601 advisors engaged in civil operations at that time, 85 percent (6,464) were military (Andrade and Willbanks 2006, 16). Without the military providing security and capabilities traditionally out of civilian grasp, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support may have been a failure. Even though S/CRS is making great strides to fill vacancies and possess security equipment such as armored vehicles and personal protective equipment, CRC members would more than likely require U.S. military protection in unstable areas.

The idea that there would be enough CRC members composed of active, standby, and reserve does not seem feasible. If and when S/CRS develops in line with the Congressional Mandate, there will be less than 5,000 members. The thought of being able to augment overseas Mission security staff to allow travel of CRC members into areas deemed off limits to interagency personnel poses too much of a risk.

It appears that S/CRS has shifted focus towards prevention of instability. That seems to be more in line with their capabilities at this time. Reconstructing and stabilizing countries following conflict or civil unrest is crucial to securing the U.S. State

must develop S/CRS or the capabilities necessary to successfully complete the tasks as defined by the nation's leadership. Failure to do so not only increases the vulnerability of the nation, it significantly impacts State's ability to advance freedom and democracy.

Interagency Planning

“Success depends upon previous preparation, and without such preparation there is sure to be failure,” according to Confucius. In the face of ubiquitous threats against the nation, the need for WOG planning and effective resolution ever increases. Project Horizon brought together senior executives from USG global affairs agencies and the National Security Council to look at options in an effort to improve interagency coordination from August 2005 until July 2006. Through scenario-based planning, the executives were able to build interagency capabilities, provide participating agencies with a scenario planning toolkit, and engage in the first of what will hopefully become regular interagency planning sessions.

Through the use of research and interviews, project participants created five scenarios that represent a varied array of operating environments that the USG could face in 2025. In an effort to examine all plausible angles, project participants drew on information provided by global affairs experts from the private sector, academia, and think tanks to craft the scenarios. The scenario-based approach used in Project Horizon acknowledged many possible variables in predicting the future and considered a range of possibilities. It is necessary to look at the five scenarios of Project Horizon collectively to give validity to findings of the participants.

The Asian Way scenario examined the Asian mega-corporations that are dominating marketplaces formerly commanded by American and European military and

economic powers. “Be Careful What You Wish For” vocalizes the ups and downs of America being the sole superpower in a world so technologically advanced that personal privacy is under assault. Congagement, confrontation and engagement between the world’s major powers--the Americas, the European Union, and the China-centered Asian bloc--as they all pursue greater resources in the midst of trading with each other. Lockdown views the challenges and limitations of conducting business in a society continuously threatened by terrorism. The final scenario, Profits and Principles, addresses the dangers of not looking beyond the profits of a rapidly growing global economy to the principles that are left behind.

By carefully scrutinizing these scenarios, Project Horizon participants were able to identify 10 necessary strategic interagency capabilities, allowing greater coordination against national security threats. The urgently needed interagency capabilities, briefly described here, are individual concepts that do not represent an integrated framework.

1. Quadrennial Strategic Review focused on streamlining the interagency processes. It was a look at ways to reduce duplication of tasks, efficiently utilizing investments, to formally set priorities for the most beneficial strategic plan. There are no known attempts to develop an interagency review of this magnitude. While uncertain, Project Horizon may have informed Secretary Clinton’s decision to create the *QDDR*, formally reviewing the capabilities of State and USAID.

2. Government-Wide Information Sharing acknowledged the need for every participant to have the same information and reviewed bureaucratic obstacles. Guidelines are necessary for interagency classification and security clearance models even allowing for partnerships with allied nations, non-governmental organizations, academic

institutions and private sector businesses. Gauging the level of improvement with information sharing between interagency partners is difficult to capture. This isn't brain surgery. However, transitioning to a "need to share" mentality requires a shift in institutional culture. Historically, many departments and agencies shared information under the premise of "need to know." Partnerships are imperative to benefit from information sharing.

The WOG approach requires communication among departments and agencies. Secretary Clinton has had positive impacts within State. Internal assessments of issues require engagement with departments and agencies that share an interest on the subject. For example, when dealing with global health issues, managers are required to work with Health and Human Services, resulting in increased information sharing.

3. Interagency Fusion Groups would provide a vast wealth of knowledge and expertise quickly during critical times. The President would form the groups with the assistance of Congress and they would be issue-focused, time-limited interagency bodies. Actions toward this end are yet to materialize. There are however, similarities in conceptualization to the structures of S/CRS and AFRICOM.

4. Global Health Engagement gives the USG the capability to mobilize interagency global public health resources that are readily deployable. It addresses international health threats while advancing the U.S. place as a leader in development and humanitarian assistance. State and USAID have identified a limited number of joint high priority performance goals that will be a particular focus for the two agencies from now through FY 2011, including global health. As a result, increased engagement ensues with Health and Human Services and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,

interagency partners in this effort. Additionally, interagency partners are addressing targeted health issues, countries, and regions. The final FY 2010 budget provided \$8.5 billion to fund the President's Global Health Initiative, which will increase efforts to reduce mortality of mothers and children, support the Emergency Plan for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, and the Malaria Initiative.

5. Global Hazards Planning and Response plans for coordinated action in cases of man-made and natural hazards. The goal is to analyze and rationalize hazardous events and plan for contingencies to ensure operational unity and the deployment of trained, capable personnel. The arduous task of R&S following natural disasters, environmental crises, and other hazards such as health related threats require vast amounts of resources, both human and economic.

Recognizing resource constraints, and the need for more lead time, has caused a shift to prevention instead of reaction. S/CRS actively fields interagency teams to complete country assessments, with a focus on rule of law, economic recovery, essential services, governance, security, and planning. The USG response to global hazards should improve as a result. However, the lack of contingency planning within S/CRS could negatively impact the USG response.

6. USG Partnership Framework is a guide for how the participating agencies would work together. It creates the interagency relationship that is critical for effectiveness. The framework would include incentives for the agencies and require clear reporting and transparency. Conceptualized through Project Horizon, the Global Partnership Initiative builds smart power. State now seeks to forge strategic partnerships with private businesses, universities, faith communities, philanthropies, Diaspora groups,

and empowered individuals. Partnering and coordinating with entities and individuals both inside and outside of the USG who form relationships with foreign populations and governments adds value to what State can accomplish towards meeting its mission.

7. Science and Technology Incentive Framework suggests that it is necessary for the USG to properly align its Science and Technology (S&T) investments with its emerging, long-term S&T priorities. The incentive structure would reward long-term S&T planning with sufficient flexibility for unplanned events. In line with the President's vision of global engagement, the final FY 2010 budget provided funding to foster S&T innovation.

8. Global Domain Foresight brings together diverse sources of information for analysis and modeling by subject matter experts and information fusion specialists to enable the USG to act quickly in response to global man-made and natural threats. Though not directly linked to Project Horizon, Forward Engagement is the process of thinking systematically about the longer-range future, and about ways in which public policy might engage the future sooner, rather than later. It seeks to comprehend major future developments in the broad categories of defense, economics, S&T, and governance. Likewise, a better understanding of how these developments interact and influence each other is sought. This type of foresight would surely improve upon State's ability to deal with the emerging wicked problems. Additionally, forethought of this nature adds to the extremely condensed timeframe leaders have to respond to issues. Reactionary responses to unexpected issues may result in haphazard actions hampering State's success.

Leon Feurth, who served as the National Security Advisor to Vice President Gore, has been developing this concept for years. With an underlying goal to launch a national security strategic foresight community that could engage in continuing dialogue to improve this theory, workshops are underway in conjunction with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, State Department, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, and the National Defense University. Participants could also engage with foreign counterparts through the Global Futures Forum, a State Department supported multinational network of experts focused on global security and foresight methodologies.

9. Human Resources Model for Global Affairs identified the need for a flexible, deployable corps of USG professionals with extensive interagency experience and expertise in global affairs. The recommendation to develop interagency rotations and training along with formal education in global affairs, could establish a pool of such individuals. This capability has led to the development of the National Security Professional Development program under Executive Order 13434 (May 2007), in which agencies are directed to develop “national security professionals” who can work together and leverage the full force of the USG to protect the nation and improve our crisis response. There are also Human Resource recommendations in the State 2025 report. One of the report’s highest level recommendations is to “strengthen the Department’s ability to recruit, train, and retain staff and leverage external expertise in support of its critical missions, including refining the Department’s human resources models to reflect the future employment environment” (Final Report–State Department 2025 Working Group 2007, 34).

10. Global Affairs Learning Consortium requires a curriculum targeting increased traditional and emerging global affairs disciplines. Initially, there would be a network of global affairs training institutions that would provide a rich, coherent curriculum for the global affairs professionals of the U.S.

Availability of such training would provide the cadre of global affairs professionals increased knowledge and skills pertinent to tackling anticipated threats. Nevertheless, this concept of global affairs learning is absent diplomatic cachet.

The strategic planning results of Project Horizon, published in 2006, were the basis of recommendations from the State Department 2025 Working Group, which met from 2006-2007. Participating members were Dr. Barry M. Blechman—co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center, a nonpartisan think tank based in D.C. focused on issues of national and international security, Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, and the Honorable Newt Gingrich. Their analysis concluded that the future operating environment had four emerging characteristics:

1. Shifting Dynamics of Competition and Conflict—With continuous advancement in S&T, and a constant struggle for resources and dominance among the leading nations, the global landscape is shifting. Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and criminal networks have a significant impact on preparations for the future.

2. Pervasive Challenges to Nation-State Power and Influence—The Westphalian system of nations will remain intact, but other growing powers cannot be ignored. Religious organizations, “super-empowered individuals whose resources can exceed those of most states,” the private sector, and many transnational networks challenge the nation states.

3. Large-Scale Revolutions in Science, Engineering, and Technology—With rapidly advancing technology, lifestyle changes are inevitable. It is believed that the gap between the wealthy and less-fortunate will widen with these developments. Advancements in science, engineering, and technology will transform society and foreign policy.

4. Overwhelming Complexity, Operational Tempo, and Interdependence—The interactions of the future will be so complex that many disciplines will be required to resolve issues. Bureaucratic structures will have difficulty maintaining in such a complex, fast-paced environment. The time is coming when nothing will separate foreign and domestic policy.

Kaplan's writing is not always appreciated, but it is evident that his vision and way of thinking warrants at minimum a close listen. The State Department 2025 report validates his foresight on the shifting dynamics of competition and conflict. Kaplan mentions a blurring between crime and war. There is also mention that armed conflict will resemble more closely "struggles of primitive tribes than with large-scale conventional war" (Kaplan 1994, 17). The world is full of terrorist cells, plotting and inciting fear in several places around the world. The U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as Pakistan stem from that very thought. Drug cartels are rampant in Latin America, and the Department of Homeland Security is working hard to impede drug smuggling into the U.S. The U.S. military institutions seem to hold military strategist Carl von Clausewitz in high regard on his belief that wars will be waged by states, but Kaplan and the Secretary of Defense share a view that the wars of the future will be more primitive in nature. A strategic view of the next two decades is the focus of

the *Quadrennial Defense Review*, but it appears that the latest version is highly influenced by counter-insurgency operations prevalent today.

Kaplan too, was aware of the growing influence religion would have on populations around the world. Individuals such as Osama Bin Laden have used religion to wage war on the U.S. Kaplan states that “there appears every prospect that religious . . . fanaticisms will play a larger role in the motivation of armed conflict” (Kaplan 1994, 17). The State Department 2025 report echoes the same sentiments.

Vast complexity is likely to lead to struggles for the bureaucratic structures to maintain according to State 2025. Provided a society that is burdened with disease, large scale migrations, resource scarcity, crime, and overpopulation, it will be difficult. The views of Kaplan seem to fit well into the thinking that informed the recommendations in State 2025.

Kaplan’s theory did however seem to disregard the possibility of technological advancements. Amid his alarming views concerning disease, resource scarcity, conflict, and population size there could exist discoveries in the future to mitigate their effects. Kaplan’s theory is vulnerable in this regard.

Amid the complex changes that are sure to come over the next 20 years, the long-term interests of the American people don’t really change. Homeland security, global peace and stability, and economic prosperity remain the major concerns of the American people. In the spirit of its founding fathers, the citizens of the U.S. want their country to remain the best country in the world, leading in as many areas as possible.

Smart power is required for the USG to face the challenges of the shifting global environment. The recommendations of the State Department 2025 Working Group

attempt to demonstrate how the U.S. can alter the global agenda to the benefit of American interests; establish procedures that would allow the USG to respond swiftly when necessary; improve interagency coordination; and restructure to accommodate the government's priorities and diverse staffing needs.

Participants of Project Horizon and State Department 2025 exerted a lot of time and energy examining the global landscape of the future, and identifying capabilities necessary to prepare for the threats that will face the nation over the next two decades. Overwhelmed by a great number of complicated and burdensome issues requiring immediate attention, leaders are often unable to engage in long-term planning. With changes in administration often come changes in priorities. In addition, opportunities and threats of the future may not seem relevant and salient today. The majority of the capabilities identified through the Project Horizon and State Department 2025 require large amounts of funding to establish. The odds of convincing Congress to provide funding in support of long-term planning are low. Ever increasing demands on limited resources often result in supplemental funding to deal with immediate issues. These types of issues and more can negatively impact recommended Departmental changes, identified through the process of long-term planning.

Successfully engaging with several interagency partners on a broad planning exercise such as Project Horizon is a step in the right direction, not only for State, but each and every participant. Several of the capability gaps identified have spawned efforts (some of which can be directly linked to Horizon), exhibiting State's belief in the WOG approach. For example, including global health as a high priority performance goal increases the USG capability to mobilize global health resources that are readily

deployable. Additionally, long-term planning highlights relevant capability gaps linked directly to accomplishment of goals.

Nested Strategies

Given the sheer complexity of post-conflict reconstruction efforts, developing a clear strategic plan of action at the outset is critical to success. Such a plan should articulate the U.S. interests at stake, define U.S. objectives for reconstruction, and lay out the strategy for achieving these policy objectives, along with a clear division of labor delineating who is responsible for what aspects of the plan's implementation. Perhaps even more important than the plan itself is the strategy development and planning process, which allows key players to build working relationships, hammer out differences, identify potential inconsistencies and gaps, synchronize their actions, and better understand their roles.

— *Play to Win*, Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Association of the U.S. Army

In accordance with the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, State jointly prepares a Strategic Plan with USAID. The Strategic Plan serves as the starting point for annual performance plans developed at all levels of the organization. Meeting performance goals signifies success in achieving the established mission. The most recent version, covering FY's 2007-2012 identified seven strategic goals, which provided the framework supporting the National Security Strategy Tasks outlined in 2006. Within each of the seven areas, the joint plan also identifies key USG partners to engage with in support of established goals. The seven strategic goals are as follows:

1. Achieving Peace and Security Counterterrorism, Homeland security, WMD
2. Governing Justly and Democratically
Rule of law and human rights, Civil society
3. *Investing in People*
Health, protection for vulnerable populations
4. *Promoting Economic Growth and Prosperity*
Environment, Agriculture, Energy Security

5. Providing Humanitarian Assistance

Disaster prevention and mitigation, Protection

6. Promoting International Understanding

Offer a positive vision, Marginalize extremism

7. Strengthening Consular and Management Capabilities

Consular services, Major management functions.

(DOS/USAID Strategic Plan FY 2007–2012)

Each of the seven goals require a WOG approach as they span several U.S. departments and agencies or directly tie to the ability of State to effectively lead and coordinate USG efforts toward R&S such as strategic goal #7 (strengthening management capabilities).

Figure 1, from the DOS/USAID Strategic Plan FY 2007–2012, depicts alignment of the 7 strategic goals with the National Security Strategy Tasks of 2006.

National Security Strategy Tasks	State/USAID Strategic Goals (SG)
Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity	SG 2: Governing Justly and Democratically SG 5: Providing Humanitarian Assistance SG 6: Promoting International Understanding
Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to	SG 1: Achieving Peace and Security SG 6: Promoting International Understanding
Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends	SG 1: Achieving Peace and Security
Work with Others to Defuse Regional Conflicts	SG 5: Providing Humanitarian Assistance
Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our	SG 1: Achieving Peace and Security
Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction	SG 4: Promoting Economic Growth and Prosperity
Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth through	SG 6: Promoting International Understanding
Free	SG 2: Governing Justly and Democratically
Markets and Free Trade	SG 4: Promoting Economic Growth and Prosperity
Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and	SG 6: Promoting International Understanding
Building the Infrastructure of Democracy	SG 1: Achieving Peace and Security
Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other	SG 2: Governing Justly and Democratically
Main	SG 3: Investing in People
Centers of Global Power	SG 4: Promoting Economic Growth and Prosperity
Transform America's National Security Institutions to	SG 5: Providing Humanitarian Assistance
Meet the	SG 6: Promoting International Understanding
Challenges and Opportunities of the 21st Century	SG 1: Achieving Peace and Security
Engage the Opportunities and Confront the Challenges of	SG 7: Strengthening Consular and Management
Globalization	Capabilities

Figure 1. Alignment of the Seven Strategic Goals with the National Security Strategy Tasks of 2006

Source: U.S. Department of State, *FY 2007-2012 Department of State and USAID Strategic Plan* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2007).

To accomplish the goals identified above, State has partnered with 11 Federal departments, several agencies, and other important partners (Homeland Security, Defense, Energy, Justice, Treasury, Commerce, Transportation, Health and Human Services, Agriculture, Labor, Education, USAID, the Environmental Protection Agency, Broadcasting Board of Governors, Millennium Challenge Corporation, Peace Corps, U.S. Trade Representative, and a host of others).

Formulation of the 2010 *QDDR* is currently underway. The *QDDR* provides the strategic and analytical basis for organizational change within State and USAID. The *QDDR* is expected to modernize capabilities of State and USAID allowing increased global progress in security, prosperity and well-being. Solutions to national security priorities will improve due to alignment of strategies, resources, capabilities, policies, and authorities (DOS).

The *QDDR* will describe the state of the world, opportunities and threats, to identify global trends, challenges and opportunities the U.S. confronts, prioritized U.S. policies, necessary capabilities and organizational changes, and resource and authority adaptations required to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow. Through the following five pillars, the *QDDR* provides the roadmap to meeting the national security challenges:

1. “Building a global architecture of cooperation: address global challenges through partnership and strategic engagement.
2. WOG solutions: lead and support the formulation of foreign policy strategies and approaches that integrate all forms of National power.

3. Investing in the building blocks of stronger societies: implement 21st century strategies that achieve measurable, sustainable progress in security and well-being.

4. Preventing and responding to crises and conflicts: build and deploy an effective civilian operational capacity to address crises, conflicts, ungoverned spaces, and countries in transition.

5. Building operational and resource platforms for success: develop the people, processes, and systems for flexible, responsive operations, and efficient use of resources” (Department of State 2010).

The interim report of the *QDDR* was scheduled for release in January 2010, but is yet to be published. Conceptually, State aims to fulfill each and every responsibility, and develop necessary capabilities identified in Congressional Mandates, Presidential directives, and long-term planning exercises involving interagency senior executives, academia, the private sector, and think tanks. This is definitely a step in the right direction. For the past 20 years, DoD has completed a similar review called the *Quadrennial Defense Review*.

Within the five pillars of the *QDDR*, State and USAID are expected to begin to establish and integrate each concept and capability identified through planning teams, academia, think tanks, and other entities. Institutionalizing the use of measures of effectiveness, producing Departmental Doctrine, and identification of missions and tasks for departments and agencies who participate in R&S operations amongst other things, were all identified in the overview of the *QDDR*. Taking time to complete such an extensive review of the Department’s capacity to effectively deal with the concerns facing this nation merits praise.

Human Resources

Kaplan suggests anarchy as the ultimate fate of the inhabitants of earth, resulting from many factors imminent today. While his views, as controversial as they are, paint a picture grounded in pessimism, the issues discussed in his article are prevalent today as the Project Horizon and State 2025 reports agree. The widespread and ubiquitous nature of these issues, coupled with globalization and the interconnectivity of societies, highlights the need for highly-skilled, motivated, and effective employees, capable of efficiently working with interagency partners deployed throughout the world. Not only is it extremely important for interagency employees to affect change around the world, it is crucial that they realize how detrimental third and fourth order effects of their actions can be. Undoubtedly, actions must be carefully planned, and thought through with the utmost care. A one size fits all approach would hamper success. Actions must be situation specific. The information revolution and technological advances have made it possible for the global audience to view activities of the U.S., almost instantaneously, exciting reactions of an unpredictable nature. The compactness and complexity of globalism means the effects of actions in one part of the world can have deep, long lasting effects in other parts.

The law governing assignments within State allows Foreign Service employees to serve in non-Foreign Service positions outside the Department, and non-DOS employees to encumber Foreign Service positions. Authorization is granted under Sections 502 and 503 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, as amended and 22 U.S. Code 2685 grants authorization. Foreign Service employees may be assigned to organizations outside of State, that deal with foreign affairs issues in order to broaden their experience and

knowledge of the foreign policy process and develop valuable career skills and expertise. The assignments contribute to cooperation and understanding with such organizations, provide expertise and support to them, and augment State's outreach and recruitment activities.

The Foreign Service Act provides State an avenue to adapt to the WOG approach, by taking advantage of numerous opportunities, which strengthens the interagency acumen of Departmental employees. State exploits this by integrating employees into other agencies on detail assignments, actively allowing participation in long-term training offered by military institutions, as well as other programs. Furthermore, State has partnered with AFRICOM, creating new positions in an effort to engage nations at the grassroots level throughout Africa. Through the creation of a unified platform positioning a Foreign Service Officer as the deputy commander to a four-star general, in addition to other Foreign Service positions within the U.S. military, State increases its ability to achieve National goals by joining together subject matter and geographical experts with military contingents, who understand how the military investments can help advance non-military agendas.

Other options include Pearson Program details (allowing up to twelve Foreign Service Officers to be assigned to Congress) and state/local governments, senior and mid-level faculty advisors at military service colleges and commands (Faculty Advisors), Non-governmental Organizations, and international organizations. Also, employees actively participate in the State Defense Exchange Program, the Political Advisors to military Commanders positions, Multinational Force and Observers assignments, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization International staff assignments.

These changes, and others, have the potential to fundamentally transform State into a more flexible and adaptable institution. The challenge however, is to work through all of the traditional bureaucratic hurdles to effect change, adapting to the new challenges without losing focus on the fundamentals. State could reap the benefits of increasing the interagency expertise of employees, as well as, the capacity of the Department by maximizing use of interagency exchange programs.

Due to the ever increasing number of crises taking place around the world, and the need for a greater civilian presence, there should be an incentive placed on interagency training and exchange programs to facilitate leveraging the expertise of Department employees. Enhancement of employee understanding of the interagency process seems worthy of such incentive. While there are several State employees who have taken on assignments and training outside the Department, it would be beneficial to expand the number of available slots significantly. State leaders must be in a mental quandary over holding on to the best employees, for contingencies, as opposed to releasing them to attend training, furthering their expertise. The best employees could benefit from outside training as well.

Recognizing that State has not benefited from large amounts of funding, the ability to increase the pool of detail assignments offered to employees has diminished. The reality of scarce funding, which thwarts recruiting efforts coupled with more robust staffing of the U.S. Missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, has been challenging to say the least. Provided limited human resources, the wars in the Middle East simply exacerbate the problem. To better provide coverage around the globe, Former Secretary of State Rice implemented the idea of “Transformational Diplomacy,” resulting in the repositioning of

several jobs from more stable countries to locations critically in need of additional staff. Still, there was a need to request volunteers from all over the world to fill the void in the Middle-East, inclusive of the Locally Engaged Staff employed overseas. The result is several vacancies in many overseas locations, in an effort to support the Nation's highest priorities. Secretary Clinton's continued lobbying with support from the Secretary of Defense, and other interlocutors, resulted in State's appropriations being increased recently, providing necessary capital to hire desperately needed employees. Funding was made available to increase staffing approximately ten percent, even though a significant increase in human resources is necessary.

In addition to an expanded number of interagency exchange opportunities, the Department could benefit from lessons taught in Jim Collins' book "Good to Great," According to Collins, "the old adage people are your most important asset turns out to be wrong. People are not your most important asset. The right people are." Take for example the Political Advisor, State Defense Exchange Program, and Joint Interagency Coordination Group positions. Those three programs address a broad range of issues in today's complex global environment, including counter-terrorism, insurgencies, non-traditional conflict, globalization, natural disasters, famine, and emergency relief, as well as pandemics. Political Advisors, State Defense Exchange Program participants, and Joint Interagency Coordination Group representatives provide unique insights to DoD military officials in these and other areas, clarifying their comprehension of them while providing diplomatic perspectives. Positions with these classifications were recently expanded within State, increasing from just over 60 to nearly 90.

Annually, through military training programs, State employees benefit from learning the culture of the military, the military decision making process, current strategic concepts, and leadership principles, as required in the core curriculum and interagency-vetted doctrine such as Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations*. Every State employee detailed to such institutions is expected to earn a Master's Degree in Military Arts and Sciences. It would seem that employees who successfully complete those programs would be excellent candidates to fill vacancies such as Political Advisor, State Defense Exchange Program participants, or Joint Interagency Coordination Group representatives. Their familiarity with military operations and ability to provide State insight, should mark them as exceptional candidates. Unfortunately, the majority of the students currently studying at the Army Command and General Staff College, for example, have been unable to attain any of those jobs. This is especially disheartening when there are several such positions yet to be filled late in the summer 2010 assignment cycle.

It appears that State has overlooked an opportunity to capitalize on the knowledge gained through interagency training. Previously devoid of action to best utilize the newly acquired skills, State should take advantage of the opportunity to better position militarily exposed employees. There should be a process to link graduates of those institutions into positions requiring interagency engagement. Why detail employees to long-term training, if there is no plan to make use of it?

In order to effectively adapt to, influence, and predict the operating environment, State must skate to where the puck is going, not where it has been. There should be constant updates to policies and procedures ensuring the most efficient and effective processes are institutionalized. Furthermore, regulations should be in place to ensure that

necessary updates are completed expeditiously. Failure to facilitate timely change only creates capability gaps. The need for greater civilian capacity exists, with an emphasis on interagency processes. Failure to utilize employees based on their knowledge, skills and abilities will decrease the ability of State to succeed.

Innovation occurs through interactions of individuals with differing views, ideas, and ways of dealing with information. Modern organizations tend to employ, interact with, and advance people who make them uncomfortable. Dorothy Leonard and Susaan Straus solidify this point in their article “Putting Your Company’s Whole Brain to Work.” According to them, leaders need to understand their thinking styles as well as those of other team members, allowing identification of those styles that are missing in the group. When provided the opportunity to hire, they can focus on bringing on individuals with those types of styles, resulting in a group capable of generating a more broad approach to solving problems (Leonard and Straus 1997, 116-119).

The leadership challenge is to draw on the knowledge and ideas they bring to the table, in an effort to foster new processes. Simultaneously, leaders should speak to new behaviors that will help innovation efforts succeed. Many USG departments and agencies are “traditional” more so than modern. Unfortunately, the traditional method tends to discourage opinions and ideas out of sync with the status quo, ultimately stifling creativity.

Just as State, DoD could be viewed as a traditional institution. Why then should State engage in sending employees to participate in training at military institutions? Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05 reflects the U.S. military’s recognition of the importance of the WOG approach, and its attempt to facilitate the needs of the

interagency partners. By sending employees to such training, State has an opportunity to inform military doctrine, outlining its views and concerns regarding reconstruction and stability operations.

State has no shortage of intelligent people. However, the design of the assignment process makes it extremely difficult to ensure that personnel are best positioned throughout the organization. State should ensure that the right people are available, and positioned correctly, before engaging in interagency activities. Assurance of this will prove beneficial.

Throughout the USG, employee evaluations are systemically unfair and ultimately at odds with the good of the organization. The fate of employees resides in the ability of their supervisors to produce clear, concise, and well documented written feedback. As a result of widely varied writing abilities, employees with well crafted evaluations benefit from promotions sometimes in the absence of merit, while those who may deserve a promotion fall prey to a supervisor whose poetic prose is deficient. Unfortunately, this evaluation process does not provide the ability to ensure that the most skilled and talented employees are recognized and promoted into higher levels based on their abilities. This type of promotion process is highly subjective.

Current employee evaluation systems may be at odds with the good of the organization. Departments and agencies must fully develop programs for effectiveness in attempts to optimize operations, with an end-state of collectively and efficiently combating extensive threats. Following through on training by placing employees into positions allowing optimum benefit of their skills, facilitating and providing fundamental training and mentoring necessary for their success, and accurately assessing performance

all tie into the WOG approach. In the absence of these practices, how can State identify key personnel to serve as points of contact, or lead Departmental efforts related to interagency coordination? Maximizing employee and Departmental output speaks volumes to the ability of State to adapt and evolve as required by the forces of the ever changing and highly dynamic operating environment today.

Integrated Models

Issues threatening our national security must be addressed in creative and dynamic ways. However, provision of increased resources or attention to a problem does not necessarily translate into increased quality. Even though history shows that R&S works best with support from the U.S. military, using the military in such roles has not always resulted in success. Some consider this a new role for our troops, but they have engaged in these types of activities previously. Furthermore, Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations” stipulates that:

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations. The Department of Defense shall be prepared to: (1) Conduct stability operations throughout all phases of conflict and across the range of military operation. . . . (2) Support stability operations activities led by other [USG] agencies . . . foreign governments and security forces, international governmental organizations. . . . (3) Lead stability operations activities to establish civil security and civil control, restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian assistance. (Department of Defense 2009, 2)

It seems that both State and DoD are to assume charge in stability operations, but DoD begins stability tasks during those periods when it is highly unsafe for civilians to establish a presence. Interagency training at the military institutions should strengthen the

ability of our troops to perform this task. Thinking about and carrying out R&S tasks as the civilians do also improves the situation on the ground, and the transition to civilian lead when security is established. DoD leaders recognize that DoD does not have to be in the lead all the time. General Raymond T. Odierno covered this well, when he stated that “it’s about learning how to achieve unity of effort without always having unity of command over all of the elements operating within an area” (Odierno 2010, 145).

After acknowledging the strategic importance of Africa, and awareness that a lack of stabilization in Africa could impact the interests of the U.S., AFRICOM surfaced back in 2007. Prior to AFRICOM, the continent of Africa was carved up between three Regional Commands, resulting in a not so broad approach and understanding. Now, in concert with other USG agencies and international partners, the mission of AFRICOM is to conduct sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy. Africa is full of security challenges, but they in no way are threats against the U.S. military.

With less experience in Africa than U.S. interagency partners, AFRICOM organized differently from other regional commands. Less focused on traditional military activities, AFRICOM is committed to assisting African nations manage their own threats like human and narcotics trafficking, and border control. Given that the military has little experience in the region, AFRICOM includes civilians from State and other departments and agencies, providing area expertise. Most notable, is the leadership structure of the command. Traditionally, there is a four-star commander with a three-star deputy.

AFRICOM's chain of command includes a four-star commander, and two deputy commanders, one intended to be a U.S. Ambassador from State.

The prevailing thought within the military is that civilian agencies have the capabilities and resources to complete tasks where they have the lead. Civilian capabilities could be limited due to marginal funding of the departments and agencies. AFRICOM clearly shows the disparity between the number of civilians and the military. Facing critical staffing challenges, State provided 5 employees to AFRICOM. While that may seem low, several other agencies provide fewer. In total, AFRICOM has more than 800 people headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany. This civil-military structure embodies the WOG approach to dealing with threats against the U.S, and furthers U.S. coordinated participation throughout the region.

Despite advancement towards the WOG approach, the reviews on AFRICOM are mixed. While R&S is a core mission of the U.S. military, historically, they lack the training necessary to succeed. With such a limited number of locally available civilians to consult, the military may be destined to failure again. Typical offensive or defensive military operations most often require an immediate response. Because of that, it seems that there is a rush to get things accomplished. Unfortunately, as actions in one place can spawn opposing effects elsewhere, the results can be counterproductive. Whoever thought helping one group of people could cause tension amongst another to the degree we are witnessing today? That is the nature of the environment in which we operate, hence the need to think critically before taking action.

State and other foreign affairs departments and agencies are physically present at the U.S. Missions throughout Africa. Despite engagement with national leaders all over

the continent, including discussions and planning on future activities, perceptions mean a great deal. An extensive U.S. military presence throughout the region could give the impression of a militarized U.S. foreign policy. Such perceptions could bring about other issues for the U.S. to face down the road. On the other hand, the WOG perspective resulting from engagement with African leaders' increases profundity of thought, aiding in development of future foreign policies supportive of U.S. interests. Furthermore, assisting with projects typically handled by the interagency civilians provides the U.S. military an opportunity to hone skills necessary to successfully complete R&S tasks.

Countering such a militarized foreign policy view may be possible through the use of a subcategory of non-lethal fires. AFRICOM troops could easily secure embedded media representatives, strategically leveraging their ability to provide timely and accurate information about their operations, and affecting public perception throughout Africa. Why not take advantage of the opportunity to articulate their story to the world? After all, media training is a major part of the training provided to students at military institutions such as the Army Command and General Staff College.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

This study has examined adaptations made by State, on adherence to directives requiring coordination with other USG departments and agencies, to effectively respond to current and future national security threats. The strategic planning and interagency models outlined in Project Horizon and State 2025 are essential to successfully achieving the WOG approach. The research outlined the steps required for the U. S. to maintain its position as a world leader and to thwart the plans of terrorist groups worldwide. Because State openly examined its insufficiencies, plans were generated for strengthening not only those weaknesses, but also for the communication, technological, and productivity gaps between civilian, governmental, and international agencies. The WOG approach requires State to engage all U.S. departments and agencies, coordinating to resolve issues in many instances before they even arise.

With a limited cadre of employees, State should be commended for adaptations made in spite of inadequate funding. However, without the staff, tools, and training necessary to perform the required tasks, State is unable to carry-out its role entirely, as stipulated in NSPD 44. Considering the global landscape, there is no way State can successfully perform some of the critical tasks stipulated in the Presidential Directives related to the WOG approach, without extensively increased resources. Goals and responsibilities of the Secretary of State are numerous, as are factors external to the Department, which can, and often does, impede achievement. Things like terrorism, changes in government, social or economic instability, sovereignty issues, foreign

partners' actions, foreign governments' rejection of USG involvement, foreign policies, disease, and natural disasters all impact State's ability to advance freedom for the benefit of America. The WOG approach simply strengthens the U.S. response when dealing with such situations.

In light of current planning initiatives underway, and recent increases in funding to recruit, train, and support additional staff, one could presuppose that State will demonstrate improvement in the future. Identifying gaps in capabilities was necessary for improvement, but the true challenge is to rid the Department of those deficiencies. After completion of planning and evaluation efforts, such as the *QDDR*, State must evolve to overcome its internal and external obstacles. The biggest challenge, however, for State is to win the hearts and minds of foreigners as well as Americans. World public opinion polls find that foreign nations reject the notion that the U.S. should play the role of world leader. Moreover, foreign audiences believe the U.S. fails to take other than its own interests into account, and cannot be trusted. Sadly, Americans tend to agree with the rest of the world.

Within each of the focus areas of this research, State has exemplified a willingness to grow and adapt to the new environment. S/CRS capability to plan on-par with the military is growing, along with improved coordination skills. While it has been unable to fully demonstrate its capabilities, S/CRS is working hard to improve. Finding appropriate individuals to staff S/CRS, and training them seems to be a major challenge. Unfortunately, the blame for personnel shortages in S/CRS and CRC (both active and standby) is placed on State, even though funding to fill those positions took years to materialize.

Following Project Horizon and State 2025, State identified several needs necessary to meet the challenges of today. More than likely, several of those deficiencies will be reiterated during the *QDDR* process. Recognizing strength in numbers, funding to develop a more flexible institution capable of efficiently and effectively coordinating integrated R&S resolutions may emerge following publication of the final *QDDR*. State and other U.S. departments and agencies should assess their capabilities simultaneously, filling them quickly, in order to be effective. Otherwise, when State develops the capacity required to carry out its responsibilities, gaps may surface in the ability of other departments and agencies limiting effectiveness. Also, an interagency approach to solving problems requires working in unison, which necessitates a shift in cultural thinking. This is sure to take time, but State is embracing interagency planning, training, and information sharing. State's willingness to change is an indicator of progress.

Several ideas to improve the abilities of State exist. Discussions have ensued time and time again over the ability of State to lead R&S activities, through coordinating and harmonizing all USG departments and agencies. Some advocate for a massive USG restructure similar to what occurred in the military resulting from the Goldwater-Nichols Act. While that may help in providing direction and facilitating action, it may hurt in other ways. Goldwater-Nichols restructured the branches of the U.S. military, establishing a chain of command from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the Combatant Commanders. Uniformed military leaders were highly opposed to this change, even though the interests of each branch were similar.

While the USG civilian departments and agencies all support protecting U.S. interests, their roles, missions, and capabilities vary greatly. State and USAID share joint

missions and goals, but what about the other civilian agencies? The roles and responsibilities of each agency including DoD are too varied for one person to exercise control over efficiently and effectively. Additionally, that resonates too closely with an autocracy. Providing one person with such authority could be overwhelming, inefficient, and counterproductive. Furthermore, developing the capabilities necessary for the WOG approach leaves a critically untapped area that weighs significantly on State's ability to succeed.

Provided global operations, State has an enormous opportunity to impact public perception around the world. The key to doing so is transforming ideas, strategies, and vision into clear messages for their audience. Just as AFRICOM personnel could utilize information operations to influence opinions throughout Africa by telling their story, State should develop WOG strategic communication capabilities, embracing and seeking out media opportunities, to win the hearts and minds of foreign populations. Developing and executing complex, integrated communication plans is crucial to the WOG approach.

U.S. Diplomats are to be tactful, saying or doing the right things without offending others, a skill enormously present amongst State employees. However, the author believes that in addition to the elements of the WOG approach, there is a need to develop and coordinate better strategic communications both internally and externally, when countering threats against the nation. State must strategically communicate the internal DOS image it presents to the rest of the interagency, as well as the image of the U.S. to the rest of the world. Internally, State has made significant progress as a model of interagency cooperation and adopting the WOG approach. Nevertheless, organizational

adjustments remain such as deciding on the real function of S/CRS and further defining its relationship with bureaus and offices within State.

Despite Presidential directives ordering coordinated responses, policy coordination, and harmonization with U.S. military plans and operations, there is no mandate to orchestrate and synchronize communication tools to achieve USG desired effects throughout the world. To successfully coordinate USG efforts externally, there should be a known end-state prior to engagement. Provided an end-state, State should ensure that integrated communications are at the center of all U.S. departments and agencies responses. The communication must be pervasive, understood, results driven, and continuously assessed and refined. Cultures around the world vary greatly, stemming from shared beliefs, customs, and rituals. Advancing freedom and diplomacy is extremely tough. Nevertheless, to garner legitimacy and get populations to believe in the American way, the USG must engage tactfully.

Even though each of the USG departments and agencies have a cadre of public affairs professionals, better alignment and coordination should be required with regards to strategic communication. Responding to the threats of today require a coordinated response, meaning that USG entities will not act alone. Ideally, all who may have an impact should be integrated into a strategic communication plan. Unity of effort will achieve the greatest effect. Without a doubt, if State is willing and able to communicate strategically with all pertinent USG interlocutors, the likelihood of success will increase. Preparation for success leads to success. Hopefully, this research will be considered for inclusion into the *QDDR*. When State seals this capability gap, integrating it with each element of the WOG approach, it will be a colossal force.

Recommendations for Further Research

In conclusion to this research, the author determined that while State has adapted to the WOG approach, improvement is necessary in areas to stand up, equip, and train members of the staff to effectively lead and coordinate USG responses, mitigating threats against the nation. Additionally, since DoD will continue to participate in R&S missions, the author recommends further study in order to determine if and where did Project Horizon and State 2025 fall short on State's ability to integrate USG departments and agencies to positively affect civilian populations throughout the world. There is a need for new institutions in the 21st century, and we need to constantly evolve to meet the challenges ahead.

GLOSSARY

COCOM (command authority). Non-transferable command authority established by title 10 ("Armed Forces"), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2001)

Interagency Coordination. Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense and engaged U.S. Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2008)

Measure of Effectiveness. A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2008)

Measure of Performance. A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2008)

Mission Statement. A short sentence or paragraph that describes the organization's essential task (or tasks) and purpose—a clear statement of the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. The mission statement contains the elements of who, what, when, where, and why, but seldom specifies how. (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2001)

Non Governmental Organization. A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2008)

Peacekeeping. Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (JP 3-07.3)

Smart Power. the full range of tools at our disposal—diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural—picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each solution. (Department of State 2009)

Stability Operations. An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2008)

Ungoverned Spaces. Geographic areas where governments do not exercise effective control. (Defense Intelligence Agency 2010)

Whole of Government Approach. An approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2008)

Wicked Problem. A phrase used in social planning to describe a problem that is difficult or impossible to solve because of incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements that are often difficult to recognize. Moreover, because of complex interdependencies, the effort to solve one aspect of a wicked problem may reveal or create other problems. (Wikipedia 2010)

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